It is now commonplace for scholars to note that the number of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) has exploded. But in recent years, the growth rate of INGOs globally and in the United States has stagnated. We argue this stagnation can best be explained by changes in the environment in which INGOs work. Specifically, the now-dense population environment discourages new INGOs from being founded, while also encouraging competition. Analysis of a new, comprehensive dataset on American INGOs between 1992 and 2012 supports the argument, as do case studies of trends within the environmental conservation and democracy assistance sectors. The analysis suggests debates about INGO cooperation and competition overlook a key environmental factor that varies across and within populations of organizations: density. We draw out the implications of this approach for contemporary global governance. * Associate Professor (on term), Department of Political Science, Yale University. E-mail: sarah.bush@yale.edu. Website: http://campuspress.yale.edu/sarahbush.
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are central to contemporary global governance, often taking on roles states are unwilling or unable to fill. They monitor elections, provide relief after natural disasters, advocate for human rights, and protect thousands of endangered species. Yet INGOs did not always play substantial roles in world politics.
Their number and influence dramatically expanded during the twentieth century (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 11) . INGO growth was particularly rapid in the 1980s and 1990s, when shifting geopolitics, technological changes, and new international norms stimulated foundings (Boli and Thomas 1999; Reimann 2006) . (Dietrich 2016) and capture a "large and increasing share" of foreign aid (Büthe, Major and de Mello e Souza 2012, 571) .
Their role in global policymaking has also become more common, with inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) granting INGOs more access to policymaking (Tallberg et al. 2013 ).
Thus, the decline and stagnation in growth rate is puzzling from the perspective of existing theory, necessitating new thinking.
We argue that INGO foundings have stagnated because INGO populations are now dense.
This argument builds on foundational work by Cooley and Ron (2002) , who pioneered the study of how density and competition affect INGO behavior. Their study and others in the political economy tradition shed light on how INGOs respond strategically to their resource environments. Though these studies offer a potential explanation for the stagnating growth rates we observe -INGO competition -they cannot explain early periods of development within the INGO sector, in which actors engage in mutual support and collaboration to expand the resources and legitimacy of the population as a whole. Thus, political economy explanations miss an important component of the population life cycle.
We draw on insights from organizational ecology from sociology. This theoretical tradition emphasizes the role of population-level factors such as organizational density. According to organizatonal ecology, whereas would-be founders in populations with low density can expect support from other actors in their field, encouraging new entries, potential founders considering entering a dense field can expect dissuasion and competition, deterring foundings. In other words, we complicate the prevailing wisdom from the political economy tradition, arguing density has non-linear effects on INGOs, with early foundings introducing less competition than later foundings. Our emphasis on the curvilinear effects of density draws on the theoretical tradition of organizational ecology. This theoretical integration enables us to explain both the rise of INGO foundings in the 1990s (a period of low population density) and the decline in recent years (a period of high density).
We test our argument using multiple methods. We first examine data on more than 4,000
American INGOs founded between 1992 and 2012. Our datatset includes nearly-complete founding and financial information on American INGOs registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). IRS data provide a unique perspective on American nonprofit activity that IR scholars have neglected in the past, although they are commonly used in public administration. Our results suggest founding rates are indeed density dependent, even controlling for issue attention, domestic politics, and the international environment. We complement this analysis with case studies of democracy assistance and conservation INGOs, drawing on memoirs, document analysis, and interviews with INGO founders and long-time practitioners. The case studies illustrate how the experience of founders shifts as intra-population dynamics transition from mutual support to competition as density increases, providing additional support for our hypothesized causal mechanism. They also highlight some of the consequences of decreased foundings, such as bureaucratization and decreased innovation in the INGO population.
In developing and testing our theory about variation in INGO foundings, this paper makes several broader contributions. First, despite INGOs' centrality as global governors and service providers (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010) , scholars have conducted few populationlevel studies concerning the origins, life cycles, and organizational strategies of this category of actor. For example, INGO scholars have extensively debated whether INGOs are primarily "principled" or "pragmatic" in nature, conducting case studies of INGOs in various sectors to support their claims.
1 Our cross-sectoral analysis speaks to how the extent of INGO competition or cooperation -and thus, perhaps, the extent to which INGOs seem to behave in principled or pragmatic ways -might vary over time and with population density.
INGOs' abilities to live up to their principles and ideals may depend to a great extent on the environments in which they operate and the social processes through which they interact.
Second, the population dynamics we identify matter for how IR scholars study the effects of INGOs on service provision and policy change. For example, Murdie and Hicks (2013) found that the number of health INGOs per capita is positively associated with government spending on health. Likewise, Kim (2013) internet-enabled advocacy platforms -may introduce innovation in global governance, but also hold the potential for disruption. Thus, the density-dependent dynamic we theorize has important implications for not only the supply of actors participating in global governance, but also for those actors' strategic choices, a point to which we return in the conclusion.
Three Decades of Scholarship on INGOs
The United Nations defines an NGO as "any nonprofit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or international level." 2 Which organizations meet these criteria is debatable; for example, scholars disagree over whether NGOs ought to be defined by legal status vs. actual practice in terms of separation from the state. We follow most of 2 United Nations, Department of Public Information/NGO Relations, "About Us." Available at https: //outreach.un.org/ngorelations/content/about-us-0 (accessed July 28, 2017).
the literature in privileging legal status (Stroup and Wong 2016, 139) . In addition, INGOs are "international." Following Murdie (2014, 1), we adopt an inclusive approach, defining INGOs as NGOs that are actively involved in at least two countries.
The first generation of IR scholarship on INGOs showed how they spread new norms and cooperated to address global problems (Wapner 1995; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Price 2003) . For example, Keck and Sikkink described how the growing activity of networked INGOs influenced environmental and human rights policy. Their path-breaking study emphasized the functional advantages of transnational advocacy networks, characterizing them as being "lighter of their feet" than more hierarchical modes of organization (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8) . These studies roughly coincided with an intense period of INGO growth. is an important trend with potentially-significant domestic and international implications.
Although INGO populations may still be growing in some countries, the evidence suggests 
Explaining INGO Foundings
To our knowledge, political scientists have neither recognized nor theorized about the patterns we observe in the growth rate of INGOs, including their recent stagnation. To address this topic, we combine insights from two theoretical approaches. First, we build on work in political economy that shows how resource competition and population density shape the strategic decision-making of INGOs. Although political economy's focus on density may help to explain the stagnating growth rates we observe, this approach is less useful for explaining rapid growth in earlier periods. To explain both the rise and decline of INGO foundings, we draw on the tradition of organizational ecology, which emphasizes how the effect of population density varies systematically over a population's life cycle.
The Political Economy Approach
Arguably, the dominant IR paradigm for studying INGOs is now that of political economy. 
Introducing Organizational Ecology
The traditional political economy model implies that every new INGO introduces some competition into the overall sector. In other words, it assumes the effects of increased competition on foundings will be linear. effective way to achieve some common goal (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Abbott, Green and Keohane, 2016) , via a logic of appropriateness. Foundings thus bring benefits to all organizations of that type. For example, Minkoff (1995) examines the history of the U.S.
civil rights movement in the 1950s and finds that early organizations in this movement helped expand opportunities for other groups to be created. The presence of these early groups expanded the familiarity, and hence the perceived legitimacy, of the organizational form. At the same time, cooperative social networks facilitated the creation of new groups, enhancing the capacity of the movement as a whole. In contrast to this supportive early period, organizational ecology also predicts that when many organizations already exist in a population, the creation of a new organization tends to contribute only a little to the overall field's legitimacy and benefits, making organizations less likely to support one another and more likely to compete for resources.
Meanwhile, the extent of competition tends to increase monotonically with density, but at an increasing rate. When few organizations in a population exist, the founding of a new organization does create some additional competitive pressure, but not as much as when the field is already saturated with organizations that perform similar functions and seek similar resources. Combining these two general tendencies together suggests foundings will initially increase with organizational density, and then decrease with density.
This model implies that an INGO entrepreneur faces predictably different conditions depending on the density of the field she is considering entering. At lower levels of density, the beneficial effects of mutual support will prevail and favor foundings. For example, an INGO entrepreneur may receive helpful advice and guidance from others in the field; such actions may be understood as a form of cooperation, defined as when INGOs make mutual adjustments in their activities to accommodate each other (Abbott, Green and Keohane, 2016, 263 ). She will also likely face less funding competition. But at higher levels of density, the benefits of mutual support are weaker and funding competition is fiercer. The entrepreneur may be perceived as a threat, be discouraged from entering the field, and have a harder time acquiring the initial support and guidance needed from peers to sustain a new INGO.
Thus, our argument falls within the political economy tradition in its recognition of the importance of competition. Whereas it departs is that we expect the effects of densityand therefore the incentives to found a new organization -to vary predictably over time.
Where political economy approaches are mostly silent about periods of market creation, an organizational ecology approach highlights that in the early stages of population growth
INGOs often work together to build the legitimacy of their sector and promote new entrants.
In other words, increases in organizational density do not always lead to decreases in INGO foundings. This insight offers a way to reconcile research in the political economy tradition with the first generation of scholarship on INGOs, which observed cooperation between INGOs: the INGOs being studied by each group of scholars may have been operating in populations with different densities. Hypothesis 3 summarizes our empirical expectation.
Hypothesis 3: INGO foundings will initially increase with density, then decrease with density, following an inverted u-shaped curve.
Alternative Explanations
Both the traditional political economy model and the revised model that integrates insights from organizational ecology focus on how competition shapes the "supply" of INGOs.
However, alternative models of INGO action emphasize how these organizations respond to changes in the "demand" for their activities and services. The demand for INGOs stems from the vast amount of social need that is unmet by governments and markets. 3 A Quantitative Test of the Hypotheses
INGO Population Data
Organizational ecologists define populations to include groups that share common structures, patterns of activity, and normative orders within a geographic region or regulatory system (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 935 There are stark national differences in INGO practices that are related to differences in regulations, resources, and political opportunities (Stroup, 2012 INGOs helps us test the hypotheses effectively while providing significant and potentiallygeneralizable insights. In the appendix, we present data from the YBIO on INGO foundings that -although incomplete in some of the ways described above -suggests broadly similar founding patterns in the other countries that are the main headquarters of INGOs, adding plausibility to our claims to generalizability.
Dependent Variable: INGO Foundings
We begin by exploring descriptive trends in INGO foundings. We focus on trends in four populations: conservation, democracy assistance, health, and relief. with the potential exception of the relief sector, which experienced a leveling off of both around 2010. These trends provide some prima facie evidence that existing frameworks may be inadequate for explaining INGO foundings.
Explanatory Variables
To test Hypothesis 1, we measured financial resources using several strategies. Since foreign aid is a major funding source for many organizations, our first indicator is U.S. foreign assistance. We used the AidData coding scheme to identify the amount of aid in the previous year in each sector (Tierney et al. 2011) . 9 We also use data on total U.S. private giving to international charities, which is positively correlated with public funding (Giving USA Foundation 2016) . Both measures were recorded in constant U.S. dollars.
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we require a measure of sector density. We follow Carroll and Hannan (1989) and other studies on nonprofits (Lecy and Slyke, 2013) in defining density as the number of organizations in a given population. We calculated the number of INGOs that were "alive" in the sector in the previous year. 10 The minimum value for density is 9 (the number of conservation INGOs in 1992), whereas the maximum is 2,366 (the number of relief INGOs in 2012). Abbott, Green and Keohane (2016, 258) define population density differently: as the ratio of "the extent and complexity of governance activities within a population of organizations" over the "resources available for that population." Therefore, we created 9 For more information, see the appendix. 10 INGO death occurs when an INGO fails to file tax returns for at least three consecutive years. an alternative measure by dividing the number of alive INGOs by the total available financial resources, again measured in terms of foreign aid. Although we acknowledge our measure of existing resources does not capture the potential resources available to the populationa concept for which there is no ready measure -it is reasonable to assume potential and actual resources are correlated. Finally, to model the theorized curvilinear effect of density, we include a measure of the field's density as well as its square (density squared). We expect the sign for density to be positive and the sign for density squared to be negative, consistent with the idea that density has a curvilinear relationship with foundings.
We also gathered data to address the alternative explanations. First, we gathered data on sector issue attention in the previous year. We used a sample of newspapers contained in LexisNexis Academic Universe and counted the number of times that keywords associated with each sector were referenced. This database included English-language newspapers from throughout the world as well as foreign-language articles translated into English. We took the natural log of the number of references to address the problem of skewness.
Next, we gathered data on policy attention. Our measure is the natural log of the number of times that sector keywords were mentioned in the U. 
Results
Although the number of INGO foundings is, by definition, bounded by zero, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions since there can be as many as 350 foundings per sector-year.
The appendix shows that our results are similar when using negative binomial models and duration models that estimate the length of time between foundings. In all analyses, robust standard errors are clustered by sector.
We begin by examining the effects of the variables identified by the traditional political economy model: resources and density. As Model 1 in Table 1 shows, both variables are statistically significantly related to foundings, but in the opposite direction as predicted. More U.S. foreign assistance is associated with fewer foundings, while greater density is associated with more foundings. These relationships are surprising in light of the conventional wisdom as we understand it within the political economy tradition of INGOs.
However, when we add density squared in Model 2, as suggested by organizational ecology, density has the expected curvilinear effect. The estimated coefficients are positive and significant for density and negative and significant for density squared, consistent with our argument about the changing dynamics of competition over time. Although density is at first associated with more foundings, that gain decreases as density increases and even becomes negative eventually. This pattern holds when we introduce variables associated with the "demand-side" alternative explanations in Model 3. 11 As it shows, policy attention is strongly and positively related to foundings, as expected. In contrast, media and IGO at-11 The SI contains a figure showing the curvilinear effect of density on the number of predicted foundings.
tention to the issue area are negatively correlated with foundings.
One concern is that what we interpret as density dependence may be simply time Another concern is that the analysis does not directly show the effects of competition.
Providing evidence of this mechanism is a goal of our case studies, but we also explore it quantitatively. We introduce a lagged indicator of annual sector concentration to the models in Table 1 ; the results are in the appendix. The indicator is the proportion of overall revenues in the sector held by INGOs in the 99th percentile. Following studies in industrial organization, we expect that as a sector's concentration decreases, it will be more competitive. This indicator is not perfect since a concentrated market may deter certain types of foundings (e.g., generalists) more than others (e.g., specialists). Nevertheless, and as expected, concentration is negatively related to foundings. At the same time, the significant, curvilinear effect of density remains, suggesting there are aspects of competition that our fairly-crude concentration measure does not capture.
Our results are robust to other tests, as well, which we report in the appendix and summarize here. with research in the field of public administration. Although the relationships between government funding, private philanthropy, and nonprofit foundings are far from settled, cross-national studies have shown that more public and private money does not automatically translate to more nonprofits (e.g., Salamon and Anheier, 1998) . The expansion of funding, as shown in Figure 4 , does not reduce competition and encourage foundings if resources mainly support a few organizations. Moreover, and whereas policy attention is positively correlated with foundings, the same is not true for media and IGO attention. This pattern tentatively suggests an attention cycle whereby policy attention draws in new entrepreneurs, who then spur attention to their issue in the media and at IGOs.
Though robust to many specifications, these results should be interpreted with some caution. We acknowledge that there are inferential challenges associated with relying on observational data in which many variables trend over time. Thus, we now proceed to case studies of INGOs in two sectors. The cases are designed to speak more directly to the posited causal mechanism: INGO populations grow quickly at low levels of density due to mutual support, but slow at higher levels of density due to competition.
Case Studies
We focus on conservation and democracy assistance. Both sectors are "on-the-line" statistically in the sense that they exhibit clear inverted-u curves in foundings (recall Figure   3 ). The sectors also maximize variation in terms of several potential explanatory variables.
First, they involve different kinds of issues. Conservation is a commons problem, whereas democracy assistance primarily benefits people in areas where programs take place. As such, we might hypothesize that conservation INGOs would be less competitive.
Second, conservation and democracy assistance have different population characteristics. 
Democracy Assistance
Democracy assistance supports democratization abroad, whether through democratic transition or consolidation. INGOs engaged in democracy assistance design and implement a variety of programs aimed at fostering democratization. Some examples include directly supporting domestic NGOs, sponsoring election observers, advising public officials on reform measures, and providing legal aid. Such programs take place in more than 100 countries each year, and many (though not all) of them are implemented by INGOs (Bush 2015, 8 and National Democratic Institute (NDI) -that were designed to represent the interests of business, unions, and the Republican and Democratic parties in aiding democracy abroad.
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These INGOs have continued to be important players in the sector. 14 Although they focused initially on a particular issue (e.g., aiding political parties for NDI), they have expanded to cover a more general set of activities.
In-depth analysis reveals a steady increase in the resources available to democracy assis- the Peace Corps and hearing from women that they wanted to learn how to run for office.
Her approach was to work with other organizations, saying, "There's only a limited number of dollars in the field, guys, so we need to work with others to get things done. over the previous twenty years such that it comprised "a rather decentralized, cooperating community of several thousand men and women" (Melia, 2005, 9 ).
Yet as time passed, competition among INGOs increased -despite increased funding. 18 A few for-profit development firms began to seek out democracy assistance in the 1990s, creating further competition (Bush, 2015, 43) . These organizations were (with founding dates in parentheses): Tetra Tech (formerly ARD, 1966 ), Checchi (1973 ), Chemonics (1975 , DAI (1970), and Democracy International (2003) . These firms' revenues are not publicly available. Given their founding dates and entries into the field of democracy assistance, however, we do not believe slowing founding rates reflect democracy assistance simply moving from the non-profit to for-profit sector. 19 Interview, James Apple, Founder, IJA, by telephone, October 19, 2016. To be clear, he was referring to challenges given the emergence of other American INGOs, such as the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, not the emergence of homegrown democracy assistance INGOs from countries that were once the targets of democracy assistance. Bush (2015, 116-117) (Henderson 2002, 143) .
As growth stagnated, older INGOs turned on what has been described as "strategic autopilot" (Carothers 2015, 64 In sum, evidence from democracy assistance supports the hypothesized causal mechanism.
In the early era of the population -until roughly 2000 -INGOs demonstrated a willingness to support each other and establish institutions that would contribute to the field's legitimacy. Later, the field became denser and more competitive. Funding rates in democracy assistance are difficult to obtain but were reported as less than 20% in 2013, suggesting the extent of resource competition among INGOs is significant. 29 As such, we conclude that evidence from democracy assistance supports our density dependence argument.
Conservation
International environmental conservation concerns the protection of endangered species and habitats in the developed and developing world. INGOs provide a range of services, including protecting areas and parks, treating and rehabilitating particular species, researching habitat threats and diseases, monitoring threats to biodiversity, educating citizens, supporting community development, and enforcing laws related to nature preserves.
Systematic conservation efforts first began as domestic activities in the late 19th century (Brulle 2000) . The creation of organizations such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds in the UK (1889) and the Sierra Club in the United States (1892) launched an initial wave of NGOs focused on domestic conservation and wildlife management (Carmichael, Jenkins and Brulle 2012, 431) . Nature conservation became more internationally-oriented after World War II with the creation of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). IUCN was founded in 1948 at the urging of UNESCO to facilitate cooperation between national governments and disseminate research about conservation. One of its most important products was the "Red List of Endangered Species," which helped set priorities for conservation work globally (Boardman 1981 (Schwarzenbach 2011, 19) .
Although the U.S. conservation landscape had many important players by 1961, WWF-US was one of the first groups with an explicitly international focus. Most INGO action was organized through the WWF or species-protection programs based in U.S. zoos. WWF-US believed it was operating in "an expanding market" in the 1970s and thus was keen to take on projects with other groups, reflecting its cooperative ethos (Schwarzenbach 2011, 73) . In its first ten years, WWF International supported 550 conservation projects in 59 countries, including an anti-poaching unit in Kenya and an education campaign in India.
The end of the Cold War corresponded with an expansion of environmental INGOs (Frank et al. 1986; Smith and Wiest 2012) . The 1992 Rio Earth Summit launched the Convention on Biodiversity, legitimating INGOs' role in this sphere (Frank et al. 1986, 94) . Other INGOs welcomed these developments, and cooperation among these three organizations yielded major success in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the joint efforts of WWF, the Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International from the mid-1980s to late-1990s led to the protection of Corcovado National Park in Costa Rica (Boza 1993 ).
In the 1980s, WWF-US served as a grantmaker, stimulating the creation of other groups that would support its programming in specific locations or on certain topics. Other INGOs followed the WWF-US model of mutual support. For example, the Charles Darwin Foundation was formed in 1992 as a vehicle to fund conservation projects in the Galapagos, including both its own programs and those of other INGOs. As the founder described it, "when we started this organization in 1992, honestly it was pretty lonely. We were able to grow the field more generally by growing our own budget and showing up as funders throughout the 1990s." Reflecting the idea that population growth at low levels of density is mutually beneficial, her judgment was that supporting other organizations "hasn't shrunk the pie" and ultimately led to more support for its work. In addition to the increase in competition, there is also evidence that older conservation
INGOs have become more bureaucratic. In contrast to their "shoestring" early days, large conservation INGOs today control budgets in the hundred millions and have thousands of staff members. Expansion comes with important fiscal responsibilities and constraints. For example, a commonly-heard complaint is that conservation INGOs that receive substantial corporate or government funding must implement burdensome accountability procedures that make it difficult to engage in the responsive, participatory, and context-sensitive programs that some believe would be optimal. 39 If these bureaucratic transformations are widespread within the sector, as we suspect they may be, they may have important implications for service delivery in global conservation.
Thus, although conservation differs from democracy assistance in key ways, we observed similar causal processes within it. Foundings in the 1980s and 1990s were largely mutually supportive, and new INGOs were often financially assisted by older ones. By the early 2000s, potential founders faced a more competitive and discouraging environment, frequently describing difficulties obtaining needed resources given the density of the field.
Conclusion
This paper explored the founding of INGOs globally and in the United States, explaining both the rapid population growth of the 1990s and the recent stagnation in founding rates by integrating insights from political economy and organizational ecology traditions. The research agenda on the organizational ecology of INGOs could be pushed forward in several ways. First, an important extension would involve studying the relationship between density and INGO mortality. Second, our case studies hint at the importance of density as an explanation for other strategic choices of INGOs, including whether to pursue a generalist or specialist issue orientation or tactical profile. Third, the research agenda on INGOs could benefit from deeper quantitative examinations of the relationship between resources, issue attention, and organizational outcomes, as well as larger-scale qualitative and survey experimental studies that might test the mechanisms explored in this study.
Although we think organizational ecology has significant potential, we also draw attention to three challenges. First, organizational ecology is not a predictive theory. Although it identifies the expected form of the relationship of interest, it does not predict the inflection point at which sectors become "too dense" and foundings decline. Second, organizational ecology requires complete longitudinal data on all actors, both big and small. Many IR datasets lack such coverage. However, our study illustrates these data are possible to obtain, and registries may exist of INGOs in other countries and for other kinds of actors. Third, organizational ecology is sometimes criticized for presenting an overly-structural perspective.
We do not expect agents to be fully constrained by population dynamics; our case studies clearly illustrate they are not. But we do expect density to have predictable effects on entrepreneurs.
Beyond suggesting a broader research agenda drawing on organizational ecology, this These new entrants may enhance innovation within global governance, but also bring with them the potential for substantial disruption as the modes of service delivery and advocacy evolve in new directions. Government agencies may also be able to spur new forms of nonstate action in the same way they have done in the past (e.g., Dietrich, 2013) .
Finally, the rise in density and competition within the INGO population has implications for social welfare in the areas in which INGOs are active. At the organizational level, the competitive pressures that accompany an increase in population density may well drive efficiency, with the potential to improve performance. But at the population level, growing density makes coordination and cooperation among INGOs more difficult, introducing the potential for redundancies or even conflicts (Hadden, 2015) . Although reforms to contracting environments may help minimize the problems associated with INGO competition in some areas (Cooley and Ron, 2002) , our cross-sector analysis leads us to suspect the problems of INGO competition apply across a variety of contracting environments due to high density. Thus, from a policy perspective, we recommend INGO funders and practitioners focus on developing policies and performance metrics that encourage coordination of efforts and productive innovations within highly-dense and mature INGO populations.
